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ABSTRACT
We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phe-
nomenon of the combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed logic relies on the logic
of typicality ALC +TR, whose semantics is based on the notion of rational closure, as well
as on the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics, and is equipped with a
cognitive heuristic used by humans for concept composition.
We first extend the logic of typicality ALC + TR by typicality inclusions of the form
p :: T(C) v D, whose intuitive meaning is that “we believe with degree p about the fact that
typical Cs are Ds”. As in the distributed semantics, we define different scenarios containing
only some typicality inclusions, each one having a suitable probability. We then exploit such
scenarios in order to ascribe typical properties to a concept C obtained as the combination of
two prototypical concepts. We also show that reasoning in the proposed Description Logic is
EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying standard Description Logic ALC.
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1. Introduction
Inventing novel concepts by combining the typical knowledge of pre-existing ones is among
the most creative cognitive abilities exhibited by humans. This generative phenomenon high-
lights some crucial aspects of the knowledge processing capabilities in human cognition and
concerns high-level capacities associated to creative thinking and problem solving. Still, it
represents an open challenge in the field od Artificial Intelligence (AI) [Boden (1998); Colton
et al. (2012)]. Dealing with this problem requires, from an AI perspective, the harmonization
of two conflicting requirements that are hardly accommodated in symbolic systems (includ-
ing formal ontologies [Frixione and Lieto (2011)]): the need of a syntactic and semantic
compositionality (typical of logical systems) and that one concerning the exhibition of typi-
cality effects. According to a well-known argument, in fact, prototypes are not compositional
[Fodor (1981); Gleitman et al. (2012); Murphy (2002); Osherson and Smith (1981)]. The ar-
gument runs as follows: consider a concept like pet fish. It results from the composition of
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the concept pet and of the concept fish. However, the prototype of pet fish cannot result from
the composition of the prototypes of a pet and a fish: e.g. a typical pet is furry and warm, a
typical fish is grayish, but a typical pet fish is neither furry and warm nor grayish (typically,
it is red).
In this work, we provide a framework able to account for this type of human-like concept
combination by explicitly relying on a formalization of the prototype theory 1. We propose
a nonmonotonic Description Logic (from now on DL) of typicality called TCL (typicality-
based compositional logic). This logic combines two main ingredients. The first one relies
on the DL of typicality ALC + TR introduced in [Giordano et al. (2015)]. In this logic,
“typical” properties can be directly specified by means of a “typicality” operator T enriching
the underlying DL, and a TBox can contain inclusions of the formT(C) v D to represent that
“typical Cs are also Ds”. As a difference with standard DLs, in the logicALC+TR one can
consistently express exceptions and reason about defeasible inheritance as well. For instance,
a knowledge base can consistently express that “normally, athletes are in fit”, whereas “sumo
wrestlers usually are not in fit” by the typicality inclusions
T(Athlete) v Fit
T(SumoWrestler) v ¬Fit ,
given that SumoWrestler v Athlete . The semantics of the T operator is characterized by
the properties of rational logic [Lehmann and Magidor (1992)], recognized as the core prop-
erties of nonmonotonic reasoning.ALC+TR is characterized by a minimal model semantics
corresponding to an extension to DLs of a notion of rational closure as defined in [Lehmann
and Magidor (1992)] for propositional logic: the idea is to adopt a preference relation among
ALC + TR models, where intuitively a model is preferred to another one if it contains less
exceptional elements, as well as a notion of minimal entailment restricted to models that
are minimal with respect to such preference relation. As a consequence, T inherits well-
established properties like specificity and irrelevance: in the example, the logic ALC + TR
allows us to infer T(Athlete u Bald) v Fit (being bald is irrelevant with respect to being
in fit) and, if one knows that Hiroyuki is a typical sumo wrestler, to infer that he is not in fit,
giving preference to the most specific information.
As a second ingredient, we rely on a distributed semantics similar to the DISPONTE se-
mantics proposed by [Riguzzi et al. (2015a,b)] for probabilistic extensions of DLs, more
precisely we extend the typicality inclusions of ALC + TR with probabilities intended as
degrees of belief. As in the DISPONTE semantics, we make use of these degrees in order to
define different scenarios, corresponding in our case to subsets of typicality inclusions. More
in detail, we restrict our adoption of DISPONTE to label inclusions T(C) v D with a real
number between 0.5 and 1, representing the degree of belief in such an inclusion2, assum-
ing that each axiom is independent from each other (as in the DISPONTE semantics). The
resulting knowledge base defines a probability distribution over scenarios: roughly speaking,
a scenario is obtained by choosing, for each typicality inclusion, whether it is considered as
true or false. As a consequence, two types of vagueness are expressed by a typicality inclu-
sion p :: T(C) v D: on the one hand, the typicality operator T allows one to express that
only typical members of C are also members of D, on the other hand, p allows one to have
typical properties having different degrees of belief in each typicality inclusions. In a slight
extension of the above example, we could have the need of representing that both the typical-
1Thus providing additional arguments in favor of the theoretical positions according to which it is possible to reconcile com-
positionality and prototypes [Hampton (2000); Prinz (2012)].
2We want to stress that, as in any probabilistic formal framework, probabilities are assumed to come from an application
domain. This is true also for other frameworks such as, for example, fuzzy logics or probabilistic extensions of logic programs.
In this paper, we focus on the proposal of the formalism itself, therefore the machinery for obtaining probabilities from a dataset
of the application domain is out of the scope.
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ity inclusions about athletes and sumo wrestlers have a probability of 80%, whereas we also
believe that athletes are usually young with a higher probability of 95%, with the following
KB:
(1) SumoWrestler v Athlete
(2) 0.8 :: T(Athlete) v Fit
(3) 0.8 :: T(SumoWrestler) v ¬Fit
(4) 0.95 :: T(Athlete) v YoungPerson
We consider eight different scenarios, representing all possible combinations of typicality
inclusion: as an example, we can consider the one in which (2) and (4) hold, whereas (3) does
not. In this scenario, we have, for instance, that also sumo wrestlers are fit. We equip each
scenario with a degree depending on those of the involved typicality inclusions. In the above
example, the scenario containing only (2) and (4) has a probability 15, 2%, obtained by the
product of 0.8 (from 2), 1− 0.8 (since we do not include 3) and 0.95 (from 4).
As an additional element of the proposed formalization we employ a method inspired by
cognitive semantics [Hampton (1987, 1988); Kamp and Partee (1995); Smith et al. (1988)]
for the identification of a dominance effect between the concepts to be combined. Namely, for
every combination, we distinguish a HEAD and a MODIFIER, where the HEAD represents
the stronger element of the combination. The basic idea is as follows: given a KB and two
concepts CH and CM occurring in it, where CH is the HEAD and CM the MODIFIER,
we consider only some scenarios in order to define a revised knowledge base, enriched by
typical properties of the combined concept C v CH u CM . Such scenarios are those (i)
consistent with respect to the initial knowledge base, (ii) not trivial, i.e. we discard those
with the highest probability, containing either all properties that can be consistently ascribed
to C or all properties of the HEAD that can be consistently ascribed to C, and (iii) giving
preference to the typical properties of the HEAD CH (with respect to those of CM ) having
the highest probability.
We are able to exploit the logic TCL in two different perspectives. On the one hand, we
show that it is able to capture well established examples in the literature of cognitive science
concerning concept combination and, as such, we argue that TCL is a promising candidate to
tackle the problem of typicality-based concept combination (Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). On
the other hand, we use TCL as a tool for the generation and the exploration of novel creative
concepts (Section 5), that could be useful in many applicative scenarios, ranging from video
games to the creation of new movie or story characters.
As a further result, we show that the proposed approach is essentially inexpensive, in the
sense that reasoning in TCL is EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying standard ALC De-
scription Logic.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall the two semantics being the
starting points of our proposal, namely the rational closure for the DL of typicalityALC+TR
and the DISPONTE semantics for probabilistic DLs. In Section 3 we present the logic TCL
for concept combination, and we show its reasoning complexity. In Section 4 we show that
the proposed logic TCL is able to capture some well known and paradigmatic examples of
concept combination coming from the cognitive science literature. In Section 5 we exploit
the logic TCL in the application domain of computational creativity: i.e. we show how TCL
can be used for inventing/generating novel concepts as the result of the combination of two
(or more) prototypes. In Section 6 we proceed further by showing that the logic TCL can be
iteratively applied to combine prototypical concepts already resulting from the combination
of prototypes. We conclude in Section 7 by mentioning some related approaches addressing
the problem of common-sense concept combination, as well as by discussing on possible
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future works.
2. Background: DLs of typicality and probabilistic DLs
As introduced above, the main aim of this work is to introduce a nonmonotonic Description
Logic able to deal with the combination of prototypical concepts. In order to achieve this
goal, we exploit two well established logical frameworks:
• the nonmonotonic logic of typicality ALC +TR based on a notion of rational closure
for DLs.
• the DISPONTE semantics of probabilistic extensions of DLs
In this section we briefly recall such ingredients as well as Description Logics themselves,
before introducing our proposal in Section 3.
2.1. Description Logics
The family of Description Logics is one of the most important formalisms of knowledge rep-
resentation. DLs are reminiscent of the early semantic networks and of frame-based systems
(for a detailed introduction see [Baader et al. (2003)]. They offer two key advantages: on the
one hand, they have a well-defined semantics based on first-order logic and, on the other hand,
they offer a good trade-off between expressivity of the language and computational complex-
ity. DLs have been successfully implemented by a range of systems and they are at the base
of languages for the semantic web such as OWL (Ontology Web Language).
A DL knowledge base (KB) comprises two components:
• the TBox, containing the definition of concepts (and possibly roles), and a specification
of inclusions relations among them;
• the ABox containing instances of concepts and roles, in other words, properties and
relations of individuals.
As an example, consider the following knowledge base, whose TBox contains the inclusion
relations:
PhDStudent v Student (1)
Student uWorker v TaxPayer (2)
TaxPayer v ∃hasId .(Code unionsqNationalInsuranceNumber) (3)




hasId(max , 12345) (7)
represents that PhD students are students (1), and that working students pay working taxes
(2). Moreover, we have that tax payers possess an ID which is either a code or a NIN
(National Insurance Number) (3). Student , PhDStudent , Worker , Code, TaxPayer , and
NationalInsuranceNumber are concepts. hasId is a role, defining a relation between tax
payers and IDs (codes and NINs). Furthermore, we have that Max is a both a student (4) and
a worker (5), and he possesses the ID 12345 (7) which is a NIN (6).
The basic Description Logic is called ALC. Concepts in ALC are built from an alphabet
of concept names C and of role names R. Concept names define atomic concepts. Atomic
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concepts and role names are then combined in order to build complex concepts: C uD (inter-
section), C unionsqD (union), ¬C (complement), ∀R.C (universal qualified restriction) and ∃R.C
(existential qualified restriction). Extensions as well as fragments of ALC have been studied
by considering other sets of operators.
Models in DLs are Kripke structures of the form
〈∆I , .I〉
where ∆I is a non empty set of elements called the domain, whereas .I is the extension
function mapping each atomic concept C to the set of domain elements CI being members of
such concept, and mapping each atomic role R to pairs of domain elements RI being related
by such role. For instance, StudentI is the set of students of belonging to the domain under
consideration. The function .I is then extended to complex concepts in order to provide a
suitable semantics to each connective/operator, that is to say:
• (¬C)I = ∆I\CI , i.e. the extension of ¬C is the complement of the extension of C, in
other words it contains elements of ∆I not being C elements;
• (C uD)I = CI ∩DI , for instance the set of working students Student uWorker cor-
responds to the intersection of the extension of Student and the extension of Worker ;
• (C unionsqD)I = CI ∪DI , for instance the extension of Male unionsqFemale corresponds to the
union of the extension of Male and the extension of Female;
• (∃R.C)I = {x ∈ ∆I | ∃(x, y) ∈ RI such that y ∈ CI}, for instance the extension of
∃tutoredBy .Professor contains all the elements of the domain having at least a pro-
fessor as a tutor, i.e. those being related by role tutoredBy to elements of the extension
of Professor ;
• (∀R.C)I = {x ∈ ∆I | ∀(x, y) ∈ RI we have y ∈ CI}, for instance the extension
of ∀hasChild .Female contains parents whose children are all female, in other words x
belongs to (∀hasChild .Female)I if, for all pairs (x, y) in hasChildI we have that y is
a female (she belongs to the extension FemaleI).
One can reason about a DLs knowledge base by exploiting inference services like:
• satisfiability of the knowledge base: does the knowledge base admit a model?
• concept satisfiability: given a concept C, is there a model of the knowledge base as-
signing a non empty extension CI to C?
• subsumption: given two concepts C and D, is C more general than D (i.e. DI ⊆ CI)
in any model of the knowledge base?
• instance checking: given an individual a and a concept C, is a an instance of C (i.e.
the domain element corresponding to a belongs to CI) in any model of the knowledge
base?
In the above example, one can infer, for instance, that the knowledge base is consistent,
whereas it would be not if we added the inclusion (∗) Student v ¬Worker (students are
not workers, therefore there does not exist any model for the knowledge base, since Max is a
working student). The concept Worker uStudent (working student) is satisfiable, whereas it
would be not in presence of the inclusion (∗). Moreover, we can infer that Max is a tax payer
TaxPayer(max ),
and that all working students have an ID
Student uWorker v ∃hasId .(Code unionsqNationalInsuranceNumber).
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2.2. Reasoning about typicality in DLs: the nonmonotonic logicALC + TR
Since the very objective of the TBox is to build a taxonomy of concepts, the need of represent-
ing prototypical properties and of reasoning about defeasible inheritance of such properties
easily arises. The traditional approach is to handle defeasible inheritance by integrating some
kind of nonmonotonic reasoning mechanism: this has led to study nonmonotonic extensions
of DLs [Baader and Hollunder (1995a); Bonatti et al. (2009); Donini et al. (2002a)] with the
objective of fulfilling the following desiderata for such an extension:
• The (nonmonotonic) extension must have a clear semantics and should be based on the
same semantics as the underlying monotonic DL.
• The extension should allow to specify prototypical properties in a natural and direct
way.
• The extension must be decidable, if so is the underlying monotonic DL and, possibly,
computationally effective.
A simple but powerful nonmonotonic extension of DLs is proposed in [Giordano et al. (2009,
2013a,b, 2015)]. In this approach, “typical” or “normal” properties can be directly specified
by means of a “typicality” operator T enriching the underlying DL. The logic so obtained is
called ALC + TR. The intuitive idea is that T(C) selects the typical instances of a concept
C. We can therefore distinguish between the properties that hold for all instances of concept
C (C v D), and those that only hold for the normal or typical instances of C (T(C) v D).
The semantics of the T operator can be given by means of a set of postulates that are a
reformulation of axioms and rules of nonmonotonic entailment in rational logic R [Lehmann
and Magidor (1992)]: in this respect an assertion of the form T(C) v D is equivalent to the
conditional assertion C |∼ D in R. The basic ideas are as follows: given a domain ∆I and an
evaluation function .I , one can define a function fT : Pow(∆I) 7−→ Pow(∆I) that selects
the typical instances of any S ⊆ ∆I ; in case S = CI for a concept C, the selection function
selects the typical instances of C, namely:
(T(C))I = fT(CI).
fT has the following properties for all subsets S of ∆I , that are essentially a restatement of
the properties characterizing rational logic R:
(fT − 1) fT(S) ⊆ S
(fT − 2) if S 6= ∅, then also fT(S) 6= ∅
(fT − 3) if fT(S) ⊆ R, then fT(S) = fT(S ∩R)










(fT − 6) if fT(S) ∩R 6= ∅, then fT(S ∩R) ⊆ fT(S)
The semantics of theT operator can be equivalently formulated in terms of rational models
[Giordano et al. (2015)]: a model M is any structure 〈∆I , <, .I〉 where ∆I is the domain,
< is an irreflexive, transitive, well-founded and modular (for all x, y, z in ∆I , if x < y then
either x < z or z < y) relation over ∆I . In this respect, x < y means that x is “more
normal” than y, and that the typical members of a concept C are the minimal elements of C
with respect to this relation. An element x ∈ ∆I is a typical instance of some concept C
if x ∈ CI and there is no C-element in ∆I more typical than x. Elements in ∆I are then
organized in different “levels” or “ranks” by the modularity of <, where each element x at
rank i is incomparable with each other (i.e., for each y at rank i neither x < y nor y < x) and
it is more normal than all elements with an higher rank j > i, therefore minimal elements of
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C are those having the minimum rank. In detail, .I is the extension function that maps each
concept C to CI ⊆ ∆I , and each role R to RI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I . For concepts of ALC, CI is
defined as usual. For the T operator, we have
(T(C))I = Min<(CI),
where Min<(CI) = {x ∈ CI |6 ∃y ∈ CI s.t. y < x}.
Given standard definitions of satisfiability of a KB in a model, we define a notion of en-
tailment in ALC + TR. Given a query F (either an inclusion C v D or an assertion C(a)
or an assertion of the form R(a, b)), we say that F is entailed from a KB if F holds in all
ALC +TR models satisfying KB.
Even if the typicality operator T itself is nonmonotonic (i.e. T(C) v E does not imply
T(C u D) v E), what is inferred from a KB can still be inferred from any KB’ with KB
⊆ KB’, i.e. the logic ALC + TR is monotonic. In order to perform useful nonmonotonic
inferences, in [Giordano et al. (2015)] the authors have strengthened the above semantics by
restricting entailment to a class of minimal models. Intuitively, the idea is to restrict entailment
to models that minimize the atypical instances of a concept. The resulting logic corresponds
to a notion of rational closure on top ofALC+TR. Such a notion is a natural extension of the
rational closure construction provided in [Lehmann and Magidor (1992)] for the propositional
logic.
The nonmonotonic semantics of ALC +TR relies on minimal rational models that mini-
mize the rank of domain elements. Informally, given two models of KB, one in which a given
domain element x has rank 2 (because for instance z < y < x), and another in which it has
rank 1 (because only y < x), we prefer the latter, as in this model the element x is assumed
to be “more typical” than in the former.
Definition 2.1 (Rank of a domain element kM(x)). Given a model M =〈∆I , <, .I〉, the
rank kM of a domain element x ∈ ∆I , is the length of the longest chain x0 < · · · < x from
x to a minimal x0 (i.e. such that there is no x′ such that x′ < x0).
Definition 2.2 (Minimal models). GivenM1 = 〈∆I1 , <1, .I1〉 andM2 = 〈∆I2 , <2, .I2〉 we
say thatM1 is preferred toM2 if:
• ∆I1 = ∆I2
• CI1 = CI2 for all concepts C
• for all x ∈ ∆I1 , it holds that kM1(x) ≤ kM2(x) whereas there exists y ∈ ∆I1 such
that kM1(y) < kM2(y).
Given a knowledge base, we say that M is a minimal model if it is a model satisfying the
knowledge base and there is noM′ model satisfying it such thatM′ is preferred toM.
Query entailment is then restricted to minimal canonical models. The intuition is that a
canonical model contains all the individuals that enjoy properties that are consistent with KB.
A model M is a minimal canonical model of KB if it satisfies KB, it is minimal and it is
canonical3. A query F is minimally entailed from a KB if it holds in all minimal canonical
models of KB.
Example 2.3. Let us consider and extend the example in the Introduction about athletes and
sumo wrestlers. In the logicALC+TR we can have a knowledge base whose TBox contains
the following inclusions:
3In Theorem 10 in [Giordano et al. (2015)] the authors have shown that for any consistent KB there exists a finite minimal







where standard inclusions are intended as usual in standard ALC: all sumo wrestlers are
athletes, and all athletes are human beings. Typicality inclusions represent that, respectively,
usually, athletes are fit, typical sumo wrestlers are not fit, and, normally, athletes are young
persons.
The ABox contains the following facts about Roberto and Hiroyuki:
Athlete(roberto)
SumoWrestler(hiroyuki)
used to represent that Roberto is an athlete, whereas Hiroyuky is a sumo wrestler. Concerning
its nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities, the logic ALC + TR allows one to infer from the
above knowledge base that:
T(Athlete) v ¬SumoWrestler
T(Athlete u Bald) v Fit (irrelevance)
the last one stating that being bald is irrelevant with respect to being in fit. Furthermore, since




Observe that, in the last one, the logic gives preference to the most specific information (Hi-
royuky is both an athlete and a sumo wrestler).
In [Giordano et al. (2015)] it is shown that query entailment inALC+TR is in EXPTIME.
2.3. Probabilistic DLs: the DISPONTE semantics
A probabilistic extension of Description Logics under the distribution semantics is proposed
in [Riguzzi et al. (2015a)]. In this approach, called DISPONTE, the authors propose the in-
tegration of probabilistic information with DLs based on the distribution semantics for prob-
abilistic logic programs [Sato (1995)]. The basic idea is to label inclusions of the TBox as
well as facts of the ABox with a real number between 0 and 1, representing their probabilities
(intended as degrees of belief ), assuming that each axiom is independent from each other. The
resulting knowledge base defines a probability distribution over worlds: roughly speaking, a
world is obtained by choosing, for each axiom of the KB, whether it is considered as true of
false. The distribution is further extended to queries and the probability of a query is obtained
by marginalizing the joint distribution of the query and the worlds.
As an example, consider the following variant of the knowledge base inspired by the people
and pets ontology in [Riguzzi et al. (2015a)]:
0.3 :: ∃hasAnimal .Pet v NatureLover (1)
0.6 :: Cat v Pet (2)
0.9 :: Cat(tom) (3)
hasAnimal(kevin, tom) (4)
The inclusion (1) expresses that individuals that own a pet are nature lovers with a 30%
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probability, whereas (2) is used to state that cats are pets with probability 60%. The ABox
fact (3) represents that Tom is a cat with probability 90%. Inclusions (1), (2) and (3) are
probabilistic axioms, whereas (4) is a certain axiom, that must always hold. The KB has the
following eight possible worlds:
{((1), 0), ((2), 0), ((3), 0)}
{((1), 0), ((2), 0), ((3), 1)}
{((1), 0), ((2), 1), ((3), 0)}
{((1), 0), ((2), 1), ((3), 1)}
{((1), 1), ((2), 0), ((3), 0)}
{((1), 1), ((2), 0), ((3), 1)}
{((1), 1), ((2), 1), ((3), 0)}
{((1), 1), ((2), 1), ((3), 1)}
representing all possible combinations of considering/not considering each probabilistic ax-
iom. For instance, the world {((1), 1), ((2), 0), ((3), 1)} represents the situation in which we
have that (1) and (3) hold, i.e. ∃hasAnimal .Pet v NatureLover and Cat(tom), whereas (2)
does not. The query
NatureLover(kevin)
is true only in the last world, i.e. having that (1), (2) and (3) are all true, whereas it is false in
all the other ones. The probability of such a query is P (NatureLover(kevin)) = 0.3× 0.6×
0.9 = 0.162.
It is worth noticing that, in TCL, we do not employ the whole characteristics of the
DISPONTE semantics. In particular, as we will describe in detail in the next section, as far
as the inferential capabilities are concerned, we exclusively adopt ALC + TR, whereas we
use DISPONTE only as a (necessary) ingredient to generate all different knowledge bases
obtained by considering different subsets of typicality inclusions.
3. TCL: A Logic for Commonsense Concept Combination
In this section, we introduce a new nonmonotonic Description Logic TCL that combines the
semantics based on the rational closure of ALC + TR [Giordano et al. (2015)] with the
DISPONTE semantics [Riguzzi et al. (2015a,b)] of probabilistic DLs.
By taking inspiration from [Lieto et al. (2015, 2017)], in our representational assumptions
we consider two different types of properties associated to a given concept: rigid and typical.
Rigid properties are those defining a concept, e.g. C v D (all Cs are Ds). Typical properties
are represented by inclusions equipped by a degree of belief expressed through probabilities
like in the DISPONTE Semantics. Additionally, as mentioned, we employ insights coming
from the cognitive science for the determination of a dominance effect between the concepts
to be combined, distinguishing between concept HEAD and MODIFIER. Since the concep-
tual combination is usually expressed via natural language we consider the following com-
mon situations: in a combination ADJECTIVE - NOUN (for instance, red apple) the HEAD
is represented by the NOUN (apple) and the modifier by the ADJECTIVE (red). In the more
complex case of NOUN-NOUN combinations (for instance, pet fish) usually the HEAD is
represented by the last expressed concept (fish in this case). As we will see, however, in the
NOUN-NOUN case (i.e. the one we will take into account in this paper) does not exists a
clear rule to follow 4.
4It is worth-noting that a general framework for the automatic identification of a HEAD/MODIFIER combination is currently
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The language of TCL extends the basic DL ALC by typicality inclusions of the form
T(C) v D equipped by a real number p ∈ (0.5, 1] – observe that the extreme 0.5 is not
included – representing its degree of belief, whose meaning is that “we believe with de-
gree/probability p that, normally, Cs are also D” 5.
Definition 3.1 (Language of TCL). We consider an alphabet of concept names C, of role
names R, and of individual constants O. Given A ∈ C and R ∈ R, we define:
C,D := A | > | ⊥ | ¬C | C u C | C unionsq C | ∀R.C | ∃R.C
We define a knowledge base K = 〈R, T ,A〉 where:
• R is a finite set of rigid properties of the form C v D;
• T is a finite set of typicality properties of the form
p :: T(C) v D
where p ∈ (0.5, 1] ⊆ R is the degree of belief of the typicality inclusion;
• A is the ABox, i.e. a finite set of formulas of the form either C(a) orR(a, b), where a, b ∈ O
and R ∈ R.
Example 3.2. Let us consider and extend the previous example about athletes and sumo
wrestlers. In the logic TCL we can have a knowledge base K = 〈R, T ,A〉 as follows:
R:
• SumoWrestler v Athlete
• Athlete v HumanBeing
T :
• 0.8 :: T(Athlete) v Fit
• 0.8 :: T(SumoWrestler) v ¬Fit




Rigid properties ofR are intended as usual in standard ALC: all sumo wrestlers are athletes,
and all athletes are human beings. Typicality properties of T represent the following facts,
respectively:
• usually, athletes are fit, and this fact has a degree of belief of 80%;
• typical sumo wrestlers are not fit with a degree of belief of 80%;
• we believe with a degree of 95% in the fact that, normally, athletes are young persons.
The ABox facts in A are used to represent that Roberto is an athlete, whereas Hiroyuky is
a sumo wrestler.
We remind that, since we exploit the logic of typicality ALC +TR, our logic TCL inherits
its nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities.
As mentioned above, we do not avoid typicality inclusions with degree 1. Indeed, an inclu-
sion 1 :: T(C) v D means that there is no uncertainty about a given typicality inclusion.
not available in literature. In this work we will take for granted that some methods for the correct identification of these pairs
exist and we will focus on the reasoning part.
5The reason why we only allow typicality inclusions equipped with probabilities p > 0.5 is detailed in the following.
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On the other hand, since the very cognitive notion of typicality [Rosch (1975)] derives from
that one of probability distribution 6, and this latter notion is also intrinsically connected to
the one concerning the level of uncertainty/degree of belief associated to typicality inclu-
sions (i.e. typical knowledge is known to come with a low degree of uncertainty [Lawry and
Tang (2009)]), we only allow typicality inclusions equipped with degrees of belief p > 0.57.
Therefore, in our effort of integrating two different semantics – typicality based logic and
DISPONTE – the choice of having degrees of belief/probabilities higher than 0.5 for typical-
ity inclusions seems to be the only one compliant with both the formalisms. In fact, despite
the DISPONTE semantics [Riguzzi et al. (2015b)] allows to assign also low degrees of be-
lief to standard inclusions, in the logic TCL, for what explained above, it would be at least
counter-intuitive to also allow low degrees of belief for typicality inclusions (simply because
typicality inclusions with high uncertainty do not describe any typical knowledge). For ex-
ample, the logic TCL does not allow an inclusion like 0.3 :: T(Student) v YoungPerson ,
that could be interpreted as “normally, students are not young people”. Please, note that this
is not a limitation of the expressivity of the logic TCL: we can in fact represent properties not
holding for typical members of a category, for instance if one needs to represent that typical
students are not married, we can have that 0.8 :: T(Student) v ¬Married , rather than
0.2 :: T(Student) v Married .
Following the DISPONTE semantics, in TCL each typicality inclusion is independent from
each other. This avoids the problem of dealing with degrees of inconsistent inclusions. Let us
consider the following knowledge base:
WorkingStudent v Student
(i) 0.8 :: Student v ¬WorkingTaxPayer
(ii) 0.9 :: WorkingStudent vWorkingTaxPayer
Also in the scenarios where both the conflicting typical inclusions (i) and (ii) are considered,
the two degrees describe, respectively, that we believe that typical students do not pay working
taxes with a degree of 80%, and that working students normally pay working taxes with a
degree of 90%, then those inclusions are both acceptable due to the independence assumption.
The two degrees will contribute to a definition of probability of such scenario (as we will
describe in Definition 3.8). It is worth noticing that the underlying logic of typicality allows
us to get for free the correct way of reasoning in this case, namely if the ABox contains
the information that Mark is a working student, we obtain that he pays working taxes, i.e.
WorkingTaxPayer(Mark).
A modelM in the logicTCL extends standardALC models by a preference relation among
domain elements as in the logic of typicality [Giordano et al. (2015)]. In this respect, x < y
means that x is “more normal” than y, and that the typical members of a concept C are the
minimal elements of C with respect to this relation8. An element x ∈ ∆I is a typical instance
of some concept C if x ∈ CI and there is no C-element in ∆I more normal than x. Formally:
6In the sense that prototypes are usually intended as statistically representative members of a category (e.g. the prototype of
Bird in, let’s say, Europe is different with respect to the prototype of Bird in New Zealand, i.e. a kiwi which do not fly, since the
types of birds encountered by these two populations are statistically different and therefore the learned typical members differ
as well). This assumption is also reflected in computational frameworks of cognitive semantics where prototypes for conceptual
representations are naturally calculated/learned as centroids in vector space models of meaning[Ga¨rdenfors (2004, 2014)].
7It is worth noticing that in our logic, the uncertain/graded component of typicality is captured by the ranked semantics
underlying the operatorT in the logicALC+TR. On the other hand, the epistemic uncertainty is modelled by the interpretation
of probabilities of the DISPONTE semantics.
8It could be possible to consider an alternative semantics whose models are equipped with multiple preference relations, whence
with multiple typicality operators. In this case, it should be possible to distinguish different aspects of exceptionality, however
the approach based on a single preference relation in [Giordano et al. (2015)] ensures good computational properties (reasoning
in the resulting nonmonotonic logic ALC + TR has the same complexity of the standard ALC), whereas adopting multiple
preference relations could lead to higher complexities.
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Definition 3.3 (Model of TCL). A modelM is any structure
〈∆I , <, .I〉
where:
• ∆I is a non empty set of items called the domain;
• < is an irreflexive, transitive, well-founded and modular (for all x, y, z in ∆I , if x < y
then either x < z or z < y) relation over ∆I ;
• .I is the extension function that maps each atomic concept C to CI ⊆ ∆I , and each
role R to RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I , and is extended to complex concepts as follows:
◦ (¬C)I = ∆I \ CI
◦ (C uD)I = CI ∩DI
◦ (C unionsqD)I = CI ∪DI
◦ (∃R.C)I = {x ∈ ∆I | ∃(x, y) ∈ RI such that y ∈ CI}
◦ (∀R.C)I = {x ∈ ∆I | ∀(x, y) ∈ RI we have y ∈ CI}
◦ (T(C))I = Min<(CI), where Min<(CI) = {x ∈ CI |6 ∃y ∈ CI s.t. y < x}.
A model M can be equivalently defined by postulating the existence of a function kM :
∆I 7−→ N, where kM assigns a finite rank to each domain element [Giordano et al. (2015)]:
the rank of x is the length of the longest chain x0 < · · · < x from x to a minimal x0, i.e. such
that there is no x′ such that x′ < x0. The rank function kM and < can be defined from each
other by letting x < y if and only if kM(x) < kM(y).
Definition 3.4 (Model satisfying a knowledge base in TCL). Let K = 〈R, T ,A〉 be a KB.
Given a modelM = 〈∆I , <, .I〉, we assume that .I is extended to assign a domain element
aI of ∆I to each individual constant a of O. We say that:
• M satisfiesR if, for all C v D ∈ R, we have CI ⊆ DI ;
• M satisfies T if, for all q :: T(C) v D ∈ T , we have that9 T(C)I ⊆ DI , i.e.
Min<(C
I) ⊆ DI ;
• M satisfies A if, for all assertion F ∈ A, if F = C(a) then aI ∈ CI , otherwise if
F = R(a, b) then (aI , bI) ∈ RI .
Even if the typicality operator T itself is nonmonotonic (i.e. T(C) v E does not imply
T(C uD) v E), what is inferred from a KB can still be inferred from any KB’ with KB ⊆
KB’, i.e. the resulting logic is monotonic. As already mentioned in Section 2, in order to per-
form useful nonmonotonic inferences, in [Giordano et al. (2015)] the authors have strength-
ened the above semantics by restricting entailment to a class of minimal models. Intuitively,
the idea is to restrict entailment to models that minimize the atypical instances of a concept.
The resulting logic corresponds to a notion of rational closure on top of ALC + TR. Such
a notion is a natural extension of the rational closure construction provided in [Lehmann and
Magidor (1992)] for the propositional logic. This nonmonotonic semantics relies on minimal
rational models that minimize the rank of domain elements. Informally, given two models of
KB, one in which a given domain element x has rank 2 (because for instance z < y < x),
and another in which it has rank 1 (because only y < x), we prefer the latter, as in this model
the element x is assumed to be “more typical” than in the former. Query entailment is then
restricted to minimal canonical models. The intuition is that a canonical model contains all
9It is worth noticing that here the degree q does not play any role. Indeed, a typicality inclusion T(C) v D holds in a model
only if it satisfies the semantic condition of the underlying DL of typicality, i.e. minimal (typical) elements of C are elements
of D. The degree of belief q will have a crucial role in the application of the distributed semantics, allowing the definition of
scenarios as well as the computation of their probabilities.
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the individuals that enjoy properties that are consistent with KB. This is needed when rea-
soning about the rank of the concepts: it is important to have them all represented. A query
F is minimally entailed from a KB if it holds in all minimal canonical models of KB. In
[Giordano et al. (2015)] it is shown that query entailment in the nonmonotonicALC +TR is
in EXPTIME.
Definition 3.5 (Entailment). Let K = 〈R, T ,A〉 be a KB and let F be either C v D (C
could be T(C ′)) or C(a) or R(a, b). We say that F follows from K if, for all minimal M
satisfying K, thenM also satisfies F .
Let us now define the notion of scenario of the composition of concepts. Intuitively, a scenario
is a knowledge base obtained by adding to all rigid properties in R and to all ABox facts
in A only some typicality properties. More in detail, we define an atomic choice on each
typicality inclusion, then we define a selection as a set of atomic choices in order to select
which typicality inclusions have to be considered in a scenario.
Definition 3.6 (Atomic choice). Given K = 〈R, T ,A〉, where T = {E1 = q1 :: T(C1) v
D1, . . . , En = qn :: T(Cn) v Dn} we define (Ei, ki) an atomic choice, where ki ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 3.7 (Selection). Given K = 〈R, T ,A〉, where T = {E1 = q1 :: T(C1) v
D1, . . . , En = qn :: T(Cn) v Dn} and a set of atomic choices ν, we say that ν is a selection
if, for each Ei, one decision is taken, i.e. either (Ei, 0) ∈ ν and (Ei, 1) 6∈ ν or (Ei, 1) ∈ ν and







Definition 3.8 (Scenario). Given K = 〈R, T ,A〉, where T = {E1 = q1 :: T(C1) v
D1, . . . , En = qn :: T(Cn) v Dn} and given a selection σ, we define a scenario wσ =
〈R, {Ei | (Ei, 1) ∈ σ},A〉. We also define the probability of a scenario wσ as the probability
of the corresponding selection, i.e. P (wσ) = P (σ). Last, we say that a scenario is consistent
with respect to K when it admits a model in the logic TCL satisfying K.
We denote withWK the set of all scenarios, essentially the set of knowledge bases obtained
by considering all possible subsets of typicality inclusions in T . It immediately follows that
the probability of a scenario P (wσ) is a probability distribution over scenarios, that is to say∑
w∈WK
P (w) = 1.
Given a KB K = 〈R, T ,A〉 and given two concepts CH and CM occurring in K, our
logic allows defining the compound concept C as the combination of the HEAD CH and
the MODIFIER CM , where the typical properties of the form T(C) v D (or, equivalently,
T(CH u CM ) v D) to ascribe to the concept C are obtained in the set of scenarios that:
(1) are consistent with respect to K in presence of at least a C-element, in other words the
knowledge base extendingK with the properties ascribed to the combined concept C in
the scenario, i.e. 〈R, T ∪ {T(CHuCM ) v D | eitherT(CH) v D ∈ wσ orT(CM ) v
D ∈ wσ},A ∪ {(CH u CM )(x)}〉, where x does not occur in A, admits a model in
TCL;
(2) are not trivial, i.e. the scenarios with the highest probability considering either all prop-
erties that can be consistently ascribed toC are discarded or all properties of the HEAD
that can be consistently ascribed to C are discarded 10;
10This choice is motivated by the challenges provided by the task of commonsense conceptual combination itself: in order to
generate plausible novel compounds it is necessary to maintain a certain level of “surprise” in the combination, since obvious
inheritance of attributes does not have any explanatory power for human-like and human-level concept combination [Hampton
(1987)]. For this reason, both scenarios inheriting all the properties of the two concepts and all the properties of the HEAD are
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(3) are those giving preference to the typical properties of the HEAD CH (with respect
to those of the MODIFIER CM ) with the highest probability, that is to say a scenario
w is discarded if, in case of conflicting properties D and ¬D, w contains an inclusion
p1 :: T(CM ) v ¬D whereas it does not include another inclusion p2 :: T(CH) v D.
In order to select the resulting scenarios we apply points 1, 2, and 3 above to blocks of sce-
narios with the same probability, in decreasing order starting from the highest one. More in
detail, we first discard all the inconsistent scenarios, then we consider the remaining (consis-
tent) ones in decreasing order by their probabilities. We then consider the blocks of scenarios
with the same probability, and we proceed as follows:
• we discard those considered as trivial, consistently inheriting all the properties from the
HEAD (therefore, also scenarios inheriting all the properties of HEAD and MODIFIER
are discarded) from the starting concepts to be combined;
• among the remaining ones, we discard those inheriting properties from the MODIFIER
in conflict with properties that could be consistently inherited from the HEAD;
• if the set of scenarios of the current block is empty, i.e. all the scenarios have been
discarded either because trivial or because preferring the MODIFIER, we repeat the
procedure by considering the block of scenarios, all having the immediately lower prob-
ability;
• the set of remaining scenarios are those selected by the logic TCL.
More formally, our mechanism is described in Algorithm 1. Please note that this block-
based procedure extends a previously developed method that simply selected the consistent
scenarios with the probability range immediately lower to the non-trivial ones [Lieto and
Pozzato (2018)]. Notice also that, in the initial knowledge base K, we have that the set of
typicality inclusions is T ′ ∪ {q1 :: T(CH) v D1, . . . , qk :: T(CH) v Dk, qk+1 ::
T(CM ) v Dk+1, qn :: T(CM ) v Dn}, where T ′ does not contain neither inclusions of
the HEAD of the form qi :: T(CH) v Di nor inclusions of the MODIFIER of the form
qi :: T(CM ) v Di (Algorithm 1, line 2).
Lastly, we define the ultimate output of our mechanism: a knowledge base in the logic TCL
whose set of typicality properties is enriched by those of the compound concept C. Given a
scenario w satisfying the above properties, we define the properties of C as the set of inclu-
sions p :: T(C) v D, for all T(C) v D that are entailed (Definition 3.5) from w in the
logic TCL. The probability p is such that:
• if T(CH) v D is entailed from w, that is to say D is a property inherited either
from the HEAD (or from both the HEAD and the MODIFIER), then p corresponds
to the probability of such inclusion of the HEAD in the initial knowledge base, i.e.
p : T(CH) v D ∈ T ;
• otherwise, i.e. T(CM ) v D is entailed from w, then p corresponds to the probability
of such inclusion of a MODIFIER in the initial knowledge base, i.e. p : T(CM ) v
D ∈ T .
The knowledge base obtained as the result of combining concepts CH and CM into the
compound concept C is called C-revised knowledge base, and it is defined as follows:
KC = 〈R, T ∪ {p : T(C) v D},A〉,
for all D such that either T(CH) v D is entailed in w or T(CM ) v D is entailed in w by
discarded. In this respect, the typicality-based inheritance procedure of our logic falls within the so-called functional composi-
tionality, as introduced in [Pelletier (2017)].
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for concept combination
1: procedure CONCEPTCOMBINATION(K = 〈R, T ,A〉, CH , CM )
2: let T be T ′ ∪ {q1 :: T(CH) v D1, . . . , qk :: T(CH) v Dk, qk+1 :: T(CM ) v
Dk+1, qn :: T(CM ) v Dn}
3: Sel← compute all the 2n possible selections
4: Snr← ∅ . Compute all 2n scenarios
5: for each ν ∈ Sel do
6: P (ν)← 1 . Compute the probability of the current selection/scenario
7: for i = 1, . . . , n do
8: if νi = 1 then
9: P (ν)← P (ν)× qi
10: else
11: P (ν)← P (ν)× (1− qi)
12: Tν ← ∅ . Build the scenario corresponding to ν
13: for i = 1, . . . , n do
14: if νi = 1 then
15: Tν ← Tν ∪ {qi :: T(CH u CM ) v Di}
16: Snr← Snr ∪ {〈R, T ′ ∪ Tν ,A〉}
17: ConsSnr← ∅ . Discard inconsistent scenarios (reasoning in ALC +TR)
18: for each 〈R, T ∪ Tν ,A〉 ∈ Snr do
19: if 〈R, T ∪ Tν ,A ∪ {(CH uCM )(x)}〉 is consistent in ALC +TR then . x does
not occur in A
20: ConsSnr← ConsSnr ∪ {〈R, T ∪ Tν ,A〉}
21: Ord← order scenarios in ConsSnr by probabilities P (ν) in a decreasing order
22: ResultingSnr← ∅ . The set ResultingSnr will contain the selected scenarios
23: while ResultingSnr == ∅ do . Continue with the next block of scenarios
24: w← first scenario in Ord
25: Max← P (w) . Highest probability in Ord
26: CurrentBlock← {w} . Build the current set scenarios with the highest
probability
27: while P (w) == Max do
28: w← next scenario in Ord . w is not removed from Ord
29: if P (w) == Max then
30: CurrentBlock← CurrentBlock ∪ {w}
31: remove w from Ord
32: for each w ∈ CurrentBlock do
33: if w not contains all properties of CH then . Trivial scenario to be discarded
34: if CONFLICTHEADMODIFIER(w,K,CH ,CM ) == false then
35: . Scenario preferring MODIFIER to HEAD (see Algorithm 2).
Scenario to be discarded
36: ResultingSnr← ResultingSnr ∪ {w} . Selected scenario
37: return ResultingSnr
Definition 3.5, and p is defined as above.
Let us now define the probability that a query is entailed from a C-revised knowledge
base. We restrict our concern to ABox facts. The intuitive idea is that, given a query F of the
form A(a) and its associated probability p, the probability of F is the product of p and the
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm checking for a scenario giving preference to the HEAD
1: procedure CONFLICTHEADMODIFIER(w,K,CH ,CM )
2: for each qj :: T(CM ) v D ∈ w do
3: for each qk :: T(CH) v E ∈ K such that qk :: T(CH) v E 6∈ w do
4: if K ∪ {D(x), E(x)} is inconsistent in ALC +TR, x 6∈ K then
5: . Properties D and E are contradictory in ALC +TR
6: return true
7: return false
probability of the inclusion in the C-revised knowledge base which is responsible for that.
Definition 3.9 (Probability of query entailment). Given a knowledge base K = 〈R, T ,A〉,
the C-revised knowledge base KC , a query A(a) and its probability p ∈ (0, 1], we define the
probability of the entailment of the query A(a) from KC , denoted as P(A(a), p) as follows:
• P(A(a), p) = 0, if A(a) is not entailed from KC ;
• P(A(a), p) = p× q, where either q :: T(C) v A belongs to KC or q :: T(C) v D
belongs to KC and D v A is entailed fromR in standard ALC, otherwise.
We conclude this section by showing that reasoning in TCL remains in the same complexity
class of standard ALC Description Logics.
Theorem 3.10. Reasoning in TCL is EXPTIME-complete.
Proof. For the completeness, let n be the size of KB, then the number of typicality inclusions
is O(n). It is straightforward to observe that we have an exponential number of different
scenarios, for each one we need to check whether the resulting KB is consistent inALC+TR
which is EXPTIME-complete. Hardness immediately follows form the fact that TCL extends
standard ALC. Reasoning in the revised knowledge base relies on reasoning in ALC + TR,
therefore we can conclude that reasoning in TCL is EXPTIME-complete.
4. Applications of the logic TCL
We propose three different types of examples adopting the logic TCL, along with its embed-
ded HEAD-MODIFIER heuristic, to model the phenomenon of typicality-based conceptual
combination. In the first case (pet fish) we show how our logic is able to handle, under cer-
tain assumptions, this concept composition which is problematic for other formalisms. In the
second case (Linda the feminist bank teller) we show how TCL is able to model the well
known conjunction fallacy problem [Tversky and Kahneman (1983)]. In the third case (stone
lion) we show how our logic is also able to account for complex form of metaphorical con-
cept combination. All these examples do not come ex-abrupto, since they represent classical
challenging cases to model in the field of cognitive science and cognitive semantics (see e.g.
[Lewis and Lawry (2016)]) and have been showed in that past problematic to model by adopt-
ing other kinds of logics (for example fuzzy logic, [Hampton (2011); Osherson and Smith
(1981); Smith and Osherson (1984)]).
In addition, we exploit TCL to present an example of a possible application in the area of
creative generation of new characters. Finally, we show that the logic TCL can be iteratively
applied to combine concepts already resulting from the combination of concepts. This type of
iterative process has been never provided in previous formalizations trying to address similar
16
or the very same phenomena, (e.g. in [Eppe et al. (2018); Lewis and Lawry (2016)]). We show
that the procedures provided in TCL are robust and consistent enough also for dealing with
higher, iterative, levels of prototype-based compositionality.
4.1. Pet Fish
In this section we exploit, in two different setups, the logic TCL in order to define the typical
properties of the concept pet fish, obtained as the combination of the concepts Pet and Fish.
As mentioned before, this represents a well known and paradigmatic example in cognitive
science. The problem of combining the prototype of a pet with those of a fish is the following:
a typical pet is affectionate and warm, whereas a pet fish is not; on the other hand, as a
difference with a typical fish, a pet fish is not greyish, but it inherits its being scaly.
Let us consider, as a first setup, the following situation: let K = 〈R, T ,A〉 be a KB, where
the ABox A is empty, the set of rigid inclusions is
R = {Fish v ∀livesIn.Water}
and the set of typicality properties T is as follows:
(1) 0.8 :: T(Fish) v ¬Affectionate
(2) 0.6 :: T(Fish) v Greyish
(3) 0.9 :: T(Fish) v Scaly
(4) 0.8 :: T(Fish) v ¬Warm
(5) 0.9 :: T(Pet) v ∀livesIn.(¬Water)
(6) 0.8 :: T(Pet) v Affectionate
(7) 0.8 :: T(Pet) vWarm
By the properties of the typicality operatorT, reasoning relying on the underlyingALC+TR
we have that
(∗) T(Pet u Fish) v ∀livesIn.Water .
Indeed, Fish v ∀livesIn.Water is a rigid property, which is always preferred to a typical
one: in this case, additionally, the rigid property is also associated to the HEAD element fish.
Therefore, this element is reinforced.
Since | T |= 7, we have 27 = 128 different scenarios. We can observe that some of them
are not consistent11, more precisely those
(i) containing the inclusion 5, thus contradicting (∗);
(ii) containing both inclusions 1 and 6;
(iii) containing both inclusions 4 and 7.
It is worth noticing that this setting of the example represents one of worst cases in our anal-
ysis: indeed, the probabilities associated to the properties in T related to the MODIFIER are
not lower than the ones associated to the properties in T related to the HEAD12.
The scenario with the highest probability (up to 20%) is both trivial and inconsistent: in-
deed, since probabilities pi equipping typicality inclusions are such that pi > 0.5 by defini-
11The inconsistency arises when the knowledge base is extended by two contradicting properties for the combined concept, for
instance the knowledge base extended by bothT(Pet uFish) vWarm andT(Pet uFish) v ¬Warm would be consistent
only if there are no pet fishes.
12It is worth noticing that the logicTCL would select the same scenario also in the more challenging situation in which degrees
of properties of the HEAD are strictly lower, for instance in case inclusion 1 would be replaced in T by 0.7 :: T(Fish) v
¬Affectionate.
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tion, we immediately have that the higher is the number of inclusions belonging to a scenario
the higher is the associated probability. Since typicality inclusions introduce properties that
are pairwise inconsistent, it follows that such scenarios must be discarded (Algorithm 1, from
line 17).
As described in the previous section, we consider the other blocks of consistent scenarios
considering their probabilities in descending order (Algorithm 1, lines from 21). Figure 1
shows the 27 = 128 different scenarios, one row for each scenario.
All scenarios with probabilities ranging from 19.907% down to 0.164% are inconsistent.
The first valid block contains scenarios whose probability is 0.138%: the four consistent sce-
narios of this block, however, are discarded. Indeed, they either contain the inclusions 6 but
not 1 or 7 but not 4, namely they give preference to the MODIFIER concerning a conflicting
property of the HEAD, or they are trivial, i.e. they inherit all the properties of the HEAD
(Algorithm 1, lines 32-35).
The next block contains four scenarios with probability of 0.092%. The first two scenarios,
again, either contain inclusions 6 and not 1 or contain 7 and not 4, namely again it privileges
the MODIFIER with respect to the corresponding negation in the HEAD. Therefore, these
scenarios are discarded. The same for the last one, where both 6 and 7 are included rather
than 1 and 4. The remaining scenario of this block includes three out of four properties of the
HEAD, therefore it is not trivial and it is selected by the logic TCL for the composition of the
two initial prototypes.
In conclusion, in our proposal, the not trivial scenario defining prototypical properties of
a pet fish is defined from the selection σ = {(1, 1), (2, 0), (3, 1), (4, 1), (5, 0), (6, 0), (7, 0)},
and contains inclusions 1, 3, and 4, and the resulting scenario wσ is as follows:
1. 0.8 :: T(Fish) v ¬Affectionate
3. 0.9 :: T(Fish) v Scaly
4. 0.8 :: T(Fish) v ¬Warm
The resulting Pet u Fish-revised knowledge base that the logic TCL suggests is as follows:
KPet u Fish = 〈{Fish v ∀livesIn.Water}, T ′, ∅〉,
where T is:
• 0.8 :: T(Fish) v ¬Affectionate
• 0.6 :: T(Fish) v Greyish
• 0.9 :: T(Fish) v Scaly
• 0.8 :: T(Fish) v ¬Warm
• 0.9 :: T(Pet) v ∀livesIn.(¬Water)
• 0.8 :: T(Pet) v Affectionate
• 0.8 :: T(Pet) vWarm
• 0.8 :: T(Pet u Fish) v ¬Affectionate
• 0.9 :: T(Pet u Fish) v Scaly
• 0.8 :: T(Pet u Fish) v ¬Warm
Notice that in our logic TCL, adding a new inclusion T(Pet u Fish) v Red , would not be
problematic. (i.e. this means that our formalism is able to tackle the phenomenon of proto-
typical attributes emergence for the new compound concept, a well established effect within
the cognitive science literature [Hampton (1987)]).
Let us now consider the PET FISH problem by adopting a starting knowledge base whose
inclusions are equipped with different probabilities. In particular: let K = 〈R, T ,A〉 be a the
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Figure 1.: Scenarios of the combination of Pet and Fish . For the sake of readability we cut off the first
part of the figure since the first blocks of the combination, i.e. 52 scenarios, are all inconsistent.
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KB, where the ABox A is empty, the set of rigid inclusions is, as in the previous case,
R = {Fish v ∀livesIn.Water}
and the set of typicality properties T is now as follows:
(1) 0.9 :: T(Fish) v ¬Affectionate
(2) 0.8 :: T(Fish) v Greyish
(3) 0.8 :: T(Fish) v Scaly
(4) 0.9 :: T(Fish) v ¬Warm
(5) 0.8 :: T(Pet) v ∀livesIn.(¬Water)
(6) 0.9 :: T(Pet) v Affectionate
(7) 0.95 :: T(Pet) vWarm
As in the previous case, by the properties of the typicality operator T, we inherit from the
underlying ALC +TR that T(Pet u Fish) v ∀livesIn.Water .
In the novel set of generated scenarios we have that the scenario with the highest probability
(up to 35%) is both trivial and inconsistent, therefore the following blocks of scenarios are
considered.
Scenarios with probabilities from 35, 459% down to 0.117% are inconsistent. Considering
blocks of consistent scenarios in descending order of their probabilities, all scenarios with
probabilities ranging from 0.109% down to 0.027% are discarded since they are either trivial,
i.e. all the properties of the HEAD are inherited, or they privilege the MODIFIER against the
HEAD.
The first valid block, i.e. block # 4 in Figure 2, with probability 0.013%, contains four
consistent scenarios. Again, two of them are discarded for HEAD/MODIFIER heuristics.
Among the remaining two valid scenarios, only one of them is able to model the pet fish
phenomenon: it includes three out of four properties of the HEAD, therefore it is not trivial
and it is selected by the logic TCL for the composition of the two initial prototypes.
In this case TCL remains agnostic with respect to the final selection of the scenario. For the
sake of our purpose, indeed, the fact thatTCL selects the block containing the scenario with the
right answer to the PET FISH problem is, even if a non optimal solution, a satisfying one. In
fact, the assigned probabilities in the initial KB can be considered a more complicated testbed
for this combination with respect to the previous setup. Indeed, in the latter case, there is i)
no probability in the HEAD higher than those in the MODIFIER and ii) the attribute that is
expected to be discarded has not a lower probability than the other properties that are assumed
to be inherited by the compound concept.
In this respect, it seems an acceptable compromise that the correct solution is included in
the set of selected scenarios having the same probability13. It is worth-noticing that also in the
PET FISH formalization proposed by [Lewis and Lawry (2016)] it is explicitly mentioned that
the result of the right composition in the PET FISH problem is reliant on the values chosen
for the prototypes of PET and FISH (as this example shows). In particular, with respect to the
proposal by [Lewis and Lawry (2016)], where the authors assume that the concepts of PET
and FISH are exclusively represented by the properties: “lives in house” and “furry” (with
weighed values of 0.6 and 0.4 respectively) and “lives in water” and “scaly” respectively
(both with values 0.5), our logic is able to handle a more complicated running example and is
able to deal with the problem of blocking - under reasonable circumstances (including some
13As we will see in the next sections, in application domains in which TCL is exploited, e.g. in the field of computational
creativity, where it is not always easy to define which is the “correct” combination, this situation is not uncommon. As a




Figure 2.: Scenarios of the combination of Pet and Fish . For the sake of readability we cut off the first
part of the figure since the first blocks of the combination, i.e. 43 scenarios, are all inconsistent.
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of the most challenging ones) - the inheritance of undesired properties (e.g like in the case
of “greyish”, not presented in the formalization of [Lewis and Lawry (2016)] but available in
all the descriptions of the PET FISH problem provided by the cognitive science literature on
the phenomenon). In the case of TCL, the only situation that cannot be handled is represented
by a starting KB assigning the highest degree of belief/probability value to the property of
the combination that should be discarded. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no
formalization that is currently able to handle such a situation.
4.2. Linda the feminist bank teller
We now exploit the logic TCL in order to tackle the conjunction fallacy problem (or “Linda
Problem”). The problem configuration is as follows: let us suppose to know that Linda is a
31 years old, single, outspoken, and bright lady. She majored in philosophy and was con-
cerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations. When asked to rank the probability of the statements 1) “Linda is a bank
teller” and 2) “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement”, the majority of
people rank 2) as more probable than 1), violating the classic probability rules. In our logic,
let K = 〈R, T ,A〉 be a KB, where A = ∅, T is:
0.8 :: T(Feminist) v Bright
0.9 :: T(Feminist) v OutSpoken
0.8 :: T(Feminist) v ∃fightsFor .SocialJustice
0.9 :: T(Feminist) v Environmentalist
0.6 :: T(BankTeller) v ¬∃fightsFor .SocialJustice
0.8 :: T(BankTeller) v Calm
andR is as follows:
BankTeller v ∃isEmployed .Bank
Feminist v ∃believesIn.Feminism
Feminist v Female
Environmentalist v ∃isAgainst .NuclearEnergyDevelopment
Let us consider the compound concept Feminist u BankTeller . It can be obtained in
two different ways, namely by choosing Feminist as the HEAD and BankTeller as the
MODIFIER, or vice versa. First, we consider Feminist as the HEAD. In TCL, the com-
pound concept inherits all the rigid properties, that is to say Feminist u BankTeller is
included in ∃isEmployed .Bank , in ∃believesIn.Feminism and in Female. Concerning the
typical properties, two of them are in contrast, namely typical feminists fight for social jus-
tice, whereas typical bank tellers do not. All the scenarios including both T(Feminist) v
∃fightsFor .SocialJustice and T(BankTeller) v ¬∃fightsFor .SocialJustice are then
inconsistent. Concerning the remaining ones, scenarios including T(BankTeller) v
¬∃fightsFor .SocialJustice are discarded, in favor of scenarios including T(Feminist) v
∃fightsFor .SocialJustice. The most obvious scenario, with the highest probability, corre-
sponds to the one including all the typicality inclusions related to the HEAD. In the logic TCL
we discard it and we focus on the remaining ones. Among them, one of the scenarios having
the highest probability is the one not includingT(Feminist) v Bright . This scenario defines
the following Feminist u BankTeller -revised knowledge base:
0.9 :: T(Feminist u BankTeller) v OutSpoken
0.8 :: T(Feminist u BankTeller) v ∃fightsFor .SocialJustice
0.9 :: T(Feminist u BankTeller) v Environmentalist
0.8 :: T(Feminist u BankTeller) v Calm
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In our logic, solving the conjunction fallacy problem 14 means that we have to find the
most appropriate category for Linda. In our case the choice is between BankTeller and
Feminist u BankTeller . We can assume that, in absence of any other information, the de-
scribed properties that are explicitly assigned to the instance Linda can be set to a default
probability value of 0.6 (that is to say: the asserted properties about Linda are considerer
“typical enough” for her description). Let us first consider the FeministuBankTeller -revised
knowledge base, with an ABox asserting that Linda is a bank teller, that is to say
A1 = {BankTeller(linda)},
and let us consider each property of the instance Linda and the associated probability of
entailment. Observe that none of such properties are entailed by the Feminist uBankTeller -
revised knowledge base with A1, therefore, for each property of the form D(linda) we have
that P(D(linda), 0.6) = 0 (by Definition 3.9). On the other hand, let us consider an ABox
asserting that Linda is a feminist bank teller, namely
A2 = {(Feminist u BankTeller)(linda)}.
In this case, we have that:
• YoungWoman(linda) is not entailed from the Feminist uBankTeller -revised knowl-
edge base, therefore
P(YoungWoman(linda), 0.6) = 0; the same for ∃graduatedIn.Philosophy(linda)
and Single(linda);
• Outspoken(linda) is entailed from the FeministuBankTeller -revised knowledge base
with A2, then, by Definition 3.9, we have P(Outspoken(linda), 0.6) = 0.6 × 0.9 =
0.54, where 0.9 is the probability of T(Feminist u BankTeller) v OutSpoken in the
Feminist u BankTeller -revised KB;
• the same holds for ∃fightsFor .SocialJustice (linda), which is entailed by usingA2: in
this case, we have that
P(∃fightsFor .SocialJustice(linda), 0.6) = 0.6× 0.8 = 0.48;
• the fact ∃isAgainst .NuclearEnergyDevelopment(linda) is entailed by using A2.
Observe that Environmentalist v NuclearEnergyDevelopment follows from R
in standard ALC, then P(∃isAgainst .NuclearEnergyDevelopment (linda), 0.6) =
14The attempt of modelling a reasoning error could seem prima facie, counterintuitive in an AI setting. However, it is worth-
noting that this type of reasoning corresponds to a very powerful evolutionary heuristics developed by humans and strongly
relying on common-sense knowledge. The use of typical knowledge in cognitive tasks, in fact, has to do with the constraints
that concern every finite agent that has a limited access to the knowledge relevant for a given task. Consider for example the
following variant of the Linda problem. Let us suppose that a certain individual Pluto is described as follows. He weighs about
250 kg, and he is approximately two meters tall. His body is covered with a thick, dark fur, he has a large mouth with robust
teeth and paws with long claws. He roars and growls. Now, given this information, we have to evaluate the plausibility of the
two following alternatives: a) Pippo is a mammal; b) Pippo is a mammal, and he is wild and dangerous. Which is the “correct”
answer? According to the dictates of the normative theory of probability, it is surely a). But if you encounter Pippo in the
wilderness, it would probably be best to run.
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0.6 × 0.9 = 0.54 by Definition 3.9, where 0.9 is the probability of T(Feminist u
BankTeller) v Environmentalist in the Feminist u BankTeller -revised KB.
Computing the sum of the probabilities of the queries of all facts about Linda, we obtain
0.54+0.48+0.54 = 1.56, to witness that the choice ofA2 is more appropriate w.r.t. the choice
ofA1 where the sum is 0. This means that, in our logic, the human choice of classifying Linda
as a feminist bank teller sounds perfectly plausible and has to be preferred to the alternative
one of classifying her as a bank teller.
Let us now consider the case in which BankTeller is the HEAD. In this case, the
BankTeller u Feminist-revised knowledge base would be as follows:
0.8 :: T(BankTeller u Feminist) v Bright
0.9 :: T(BankTeller u Feminist) v OutSpoken
0.8 :: T(BankTeller u Feminist) v ∃fightsFor .SocialJustice
0.9 :: T(BankTeller u Feminist) v Environmentalist
0.8 :: T(BankTeller u Feminist) v Calm
Also in this case, the probability that Linda is a bank teller feminist is higher (2.04) than the
probability of classifying her as a bank teller (as in the previous case, equals to zero).
4.3. Metaphorical Concept Combination: a prototype of the Stone Lion
In this section we consider a particular type of concept combination based on the nonmonono-
tonic character of TCL. In particular, we take into account a classical case of metaphorical
concept composition considered in the field of cognitive semantics: the Stone Lion exam-
ple [Franks (1995); Ga¨rdenfors (1998, 2014)]. If we consider the concept Lion in isolation,
typically it is inferred that it is alive, it has fur and a tail, and so on. If we consider the com-
bination of concept Stone and Lion, on the other hand, the only inherited aspect which is
Lion-like is its shape, this means that, in this case, the effect of the combination is obtained
because a stone object is metaphorically seen as a lion, due to its shape. Let us consider in
detail this example, and let us exploit the logic TCL in order to provide a commonsense de-
scription of a prototype of the Stone Lion. Let K = 〈R, T ,A〉 be a KB, where: A is empty,
R = {MainColorYellowish uMainColorGreyish v ⊥} are empty, and T is as follows:
(1) 0.9 :: T(Stone) v HardMaterial
(2) 0.8 :: T(Stone) v MainColorGreyish
(3) 0.7 :: T(Stone) v Rolling
(4) 0.8 :: T(Lion) v MainColorYellowish
(5) 0.7 :: T(Lion) v ∃has.Tail
We consider Stone as the HEAD and Lion as the MODIFIER in defining this combination.
Figure 3 shows the 25 = 32 different scenarios, one row for each scenario, in descending
order of provability. As in the example of the pet fish, inconsistent scenarios are highlighted
in the last column.
From a probabilistic perspective, the first three scenarios are inconsistent since
both inclusions 2 and 4 are included, in other words we would have T(Stone u
Lion) v MainColorGreyish and T(Stone u Lion) v MainColorYellowish , having that
MainColorGreyish uMainColorYellowish v ⊥. The first block to consider contains two
scenarios with probability 7.056%: the first one is discarded since it privileges a property of
the MODIFIER (having MainColorYellowish) rather than a contrasting one of the HEAD
(having MainColorGreyish). The second one is discarded, since it allows to inherit all the
properties of the HEAD and its then considered as trivial. The following useful block is de-
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✅ ✅ ✅ ✅ ✅ 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,8 0,7 28,22% ⛔
✅ ✅ ❌ ✅ ✅ 0,9 0,8 0,3 0,8 0,7 12,10% ⛔
✅ ✅ ✅ ✅ ❌ 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,8 0,3 12,10% ⛔
✅ ❌ ✅ ✅ ✅ 0,9 0,2 0,7 0,8 0,7 7,06%
✅ ✅ ✅ ❌ ✅ 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,2 0,7 7,06%
✅ ✅ ❌ ✅ ❌ 0,9 0,8 0,3 0,8 0,3 5,18% ⛔
❌ ✅ ✅ ✅ ✅ 0,1 0,8 0,7 0,8 0,7 3,14% ⛔
✅ ❌ ❌ ✅ ✅ 0,9 0,2 0,3 0,8 0,7 3,02%
✅ ❌ ✅ ✅ ❌ 0,9 0,2 0,7 0,8 0,3 3,02%
✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ ✅ 0,9 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,7 3,02%
✅ ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,2 0,3 3,02%
✅ ❌ ✅ ❌ ✅ 0,9 0,2 0,7 0,2 0,7 1,76%
❌ ✅ ❌ ✅ ✅ 0,1 0,8 0,3 0,8 0,7 1,34% ⛔
❌ ✅ ✅ ✅ ❌ 0,1 0,8 0,7 0,8 0,3 1,34% ⛔
✅ ❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ 0,9 0,2 0,3 0,8 0,3 1,30%
✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ 0,9 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,3 1,30%
❌ ❌ ✅ ✅ ✅ 0,1 0,2 0,7 0,8 0,7 0,78%
❌ ✅ ✅ ❌ ✅ 0,1 0,8 0,7 0,2 0,7 0,78%
✅ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ 0,9 0,2 0,7 0,2 0,3 0,76%
✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ 0,9 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,7 0,76%
❌ ✅ ❌ ✅ ❌ 0,1 0,8 0,3 0,8 0,3 0,58% ⛔
❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ ✅ 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,8 0,7 0,34%
❌ ❌ ✅ ✅ ❌ 0,1 0,2 0,7 0,8 0,3 0,34%
❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ✅ 0,1 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,7 0,34%
❌ ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ 0,1 0,8 0,7 0,2 0,3 0,34%
✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ 0,9 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,32%
❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ ✅ 0,1 0,2 0,7 0,2 0,7 0,20%
❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,8 0,3 0,14%
❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ 0,1 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,14%
❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ 0,1 0,2 0,7 0,2 0,3 0,08%
❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,7 0,08%





















































































 1Figure 3.: Scenarios of the combination of Stone and Lion .
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fined by four scenarios having probability 3.02%:
• the first and the second ones in Figure 3 are discarded since, again, the property
MainColorYellowish of the MODIFIER is preferred to the contrasting one of the
HEAD;
• the last one is discarded since it contains all the properties of the HEAD, then it is
trivial.
The remaining scenario, the third one of the block in Figure 3, is the one selected by the
logic TCL. It contains inclusions 1 and 2 from the HEAD and inclusion 5 from the modifier,
obtaining the following Stone u Lion-revised knowledge base:
1. 0.9 :: T(Stone u Lion) v HardMaterial
2. 0.8 :: T(Stone u Lion) v MainColorGreyish
5. 0.7 :: T(Stone u Lion) v ∃has.Tail
Notice that, if R = {Stone v ¬Breath} and T also contains T(Lion) v Breath , in our
logic we would also infer that Stone u Lion v ¬Breath .
5. Artificial Prototypes Composition and Concept Invention
In this section we exploit the logicTCL to show both i) how it allows to automatically generate
novel, plausible, prototypical concepts by composing two initial prototypes and ii) how it can
be used as a generative tool in the field of computational creativity (with applications in the
so called creative industry). In detail, we extend preliminary results presented by [Lieto and
Pozzato (2019)] and we first show how our logic can model the generation of a quite complex
concept recently introduced in the field of narratology, i.e. that one of the ANTI-HERO (a
role invented by narratologists to generate new story lines), by combining the typical proper-
ties of the concepts HERO and VILLAIN. Of course, the specific domain of the example is
not relevant here; our goal is showing how TCL can model this kind of prototypical concept
composition (a crucial aspect of human concept invention) that, on the other hand, has been
proven to be problematic for other kinds of logics (e.g fuzzy logic, [Hampton (2011); Osher-
son and Smith (1981))]. We then show how the same machinery can be used as a creativity
support tool to generate a new type of villain for a video game or a movie.
5.1. Anti Hero
We will take into account the concepts of HERO, ANTI-HERO and VILLAIN extracted by
the common sense descriptions coming from the TvTropes repository 15. In such online repos-
itory, typical descriptions of character roles are provided. They can be useful for practitioners
of the narrative field in order to design their own character according to the main assets pre-
sented in such schemas. In particular, Tropes can be seen as devices and conventions that
a writer can reasonably rely on as being present in the audience members’ minds and ex-
pectations. Regarding the HERO, TvTropes identifies the following relevant representative
features: e.g. the fact that it is characterized by his/her fights against the VILLAIN of a story,
the fact that his/her actions are necessarily guided by general goals to be achieved in the in-
terest of the collectivity, the fact that they fight against the VILLAIN in a fair way and so on.
Examples of such Trope are: Superman, Flash Gordon etc.. The ANTI-HERO, on the other
hand, is described as characterized by the fact of sharing most of its typical traits with the
15https://tvtropes.org
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HERO (e.g. the fact that it is the protagonist of a plot fighting against the VILLAIN of the
story); however, his/her moves are not guided by a general spirit of sacrifice for the collectiv-
ity but, rather, they are usually based on some personal motivations that, incidentally and/or
indirectly, coincide with the needs of the collectivity. Furthermore the ANTI-HERO may also
act in a not fair way in order to achieve the desired goal. A classical example of such trope
is Batman, whose moves are guided by his desire of revenge. Finally the VILLAIN is rep-
resented as a classic negative role in a plot and is characterized as the main opponent of the
protagonist/HERO. In addition to this classical contraposition, TvTropes also reports some
physical elements characterizing such role from a visual point of view. For example: the char-
acters of this Trope are usually physically endowed with some demoniac cues (e.g. they have
the “eyes of fire”). Finally, they are guided by negative moral values. Examples of such role
can be easily taken from the classical literature to the modern comics. Some representative
exemplars are Cruella de Vil in Disney’s filmic saga or Voldemort in Harry Potter.
Let us now exploit our logicTCL in order to define a prototype of ANTI-HERO. First of all,
we define a knowledge base describing both rigid and typical properties of concepts HERO
and VILLAIN, then we rely on the logic TCL in order to formalize an AntiHero-revised
knowledge base.
Let K = 〈R, T ,A〉 be a KB, where the ABox A is empty. Concerning rigid properties, let
R be as follows:
R1 Hero v ∃hasOpponent .Villain
R2 Villain v ∀fightsFor .PersonalGoal
R3 Villain vWithNegativeMoralValues
R4 CollectiveGoal u PersonalGoal v ⊥
R5 WithPositiveMoralValues uWithNegativeMoralValues v ⊥
R6 AngelicIconicity uDemoniacIconicity v ⊥
Prototypical properties of villains and heroes are described in T is as follows:
T1 0.95 :: T(Hero) v Protagonist
T2 0.85 :: T(Hero) v ∃fightsFor .CollectiveGoal
T3 0.9 :: T(Hero) vWithPositiveMoralValues
T4 0.6 :: T(Hero) v AngelicIconicity
T5 0.75 :: T(Villain) v DemoniacIconicity
T6 0.8 :: T(Villain) v Implulsive
T7 0.75 :: T(Villain) v Protagonist
We make use of the logic TCL in order to build the compound concept AntiHero as the
result of the combination of concepts Hero and Villain . Differently from what the natural
language seems to suggest, we consider this compound concept by assuming that the HEAD
is Villain (since the ANTI-HERO shares more typical traits with this concept than with the
HERO concept).
First of all, we have that the compound concepts inherits all the rigid properties of both its
components (if not contradictory), therefore in the logic TCL we have that:
(i) AntiHero v ∃hasOpponent .Villain
(ii) AntiHero v ∀fightsFor .PersonalGoal
(iii) AntiHero vWithNegativeMoralValues
For the typical properties, we consider all the 27 = 256 different scenarios obtained from
all possible selections about inclusion in T . Some of them are inconsistent, namely those
including either axiom T2 or axiom T3, since they would ascribe properties in contrast with
inherited rigid properties of (ii) and (iii): rigid properties impose that an anti hero has negative
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moral values, and all his goals are personal, therefore he is an atypical hero in those respects
(T2 states that typical heroes fights also for some collective goals, whereas T3 states that nor-
mally heroes have positive moral values). Also scenarios containing both axioms T4 and T5
are inconsistent, since the fact that the concepts AngelicIconicity and DemoniacIconicity
are disjoint (formalized by R6).
Let us consider the remaining, consistent scenarios: the one having the highest probability
considers all the properties of both concepts by excluding only AngelicIconicity , that is to
say the one with the lowest probability between the two properties in conflict. In TCL this
scenario is discarded since it is the most trivial one. When we consider scenarios less trivial,
i.e., more surprising scenarios (we analyze scenarios in decreasing order of probability), we
discard the scenario with probability 0.13%, which includes T4, associated to the MODIFIER,
rather than T5, associated to the HEAD, allowing to conclude, in a counter intuitive way, that
typical anti heroes have an angelic iconicity rather than a demoniac one.
Next scenarios, sharing the same probability (0.09%), are as follows:
T1 0.95 :: T(Hero) v Protagonist
T5 0.75 :: T(Villain) v DemoniacIconicity
T6 0.8 :: T(Villain) v Implulsive
T1 0.95 :: T(Hero) v Protagonist
T6 0.8 :: T(Villain) v Implulsive
T7 0.75 :: T(Villain) v Protagonist
According to the logic TCL, both are adequate and represent the outcome of the whole heuris-
tic procedures adopted in TCL. Probably, in this case, it could be more useful to opt for the
solution on the left allowing to inherit a further property (i.e. DemoniacIconicity) for the
generated prototypical Anti-Hero. However, we remain agnostic about the selection of the
final options provided by TCL. This choice can be plausibly left to human decision makers
and based on their own goals.
5.2. Generating a Novel Character via TCL: a Villain Chair
Let us now exploit our logic TCL in order to create a new compound concept: e.g. a new type
of villain for a video game or a movie, obtained by as the combination of concepts Villain
(as HEAD) and Chair (as MODIFIER). Let K = 〈R, T ,A〉 be a KB, where: A is empty, R
is as follows:
R1 Villain v ∃fightsFor .PersonalGoal
R2 Villain v Animate
R3 Villain vWithNegativeMoralValues
R4 Chair v ∃hasComponent .SupportingSeatComponent
R5 Chair v ∃hasComponent .Seat
R6 CollectiveGoal u PersonalGoal v ⊥
and T is as follows:
T1 0.9 :: T(Villain) v DemoniacIconicity
T2 0.75 :: T(Villain) v ∃hasOpponent .Hero
T3 0.75 :: T(Villain) v Protagonist
T4 0.8 :: T(Villain) v Impulsive
T5 0.95 :: T(Chair) v ¬Animate
T6 0.95 :: T(Chair) v ∃hasComponent .Back
T7 0.65 :: T(Chair) v ∃madeOf .Wood
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T8 0.8 :: T(Chair) v Comfortable
T9 0.7 :: T(Chair) v Inflammable
We consider the 512 scenarios, from which we discard the inconsistent ones, namely those
including T5: indeed, since R2 imposes that villains are animate, in the underlying ALC +
TR we conclude that Villain u Chair v Animate , therefore all scenarios including T5,
imposing that Villain u Chair v ¬Animate are inconsistent. We also discard the most
obvious scenario including all the typicality inclusions of R, having probability of 14%. We
also discard the following trivial scenarios containing all the inclusions related to the HEAD,
namely T1, T2, T3, and T4.
The first suitable block according to Algorithm 1 is the one whose scenarios have prob-
ability 4.67% and contain all properties coming from the MODIFIER and three out of four
properties coming from the HEAD. Such scenarios, defining two alternative revised knowl-
edge bases (one containing T2 and not T3, the other one containing T3 and not T2), are as
follows:
T1 0.9 :: T(Villain) v DemoniacIconicity
T3 0.75 :: T(Villain) v Protagonist
T4 0.8 :: T(Villain) v Impulsive
T6 0.95 :: T(Chair) v ∃hasComponent .Back
T7 0.65 :: T(Chair) v ∃madeOf .Wood
T8 0.8 :: T(Chair) v Comfortable
T9 0.7 :: T(Chair) v Inflammable
T1 0.9 :: T(Villain) v DemoniacIconicity
T2 0.75 :: T(Villain) v ∃hasOpponent .Hero
T4 0.8 :: T(Villain) v Impulsive
T6 0.95 :: T(Chair) v ∃hasComponent .Back
T7 0.65 :: T(Chair) v ∃madeOf .Wood
T8 0.8 :: T(Chair) v Comfortable
T9 0.7 :: T(Chair) v Inflammable
According to Algorithm 1, both proposals neither are trivial (not all properties of the HEAD
are ascribed to the combined concept) nor they give preference to the MODIFIER with re-
spect to the HEAD for conflicting typical properties (in the example, we have only a conflict
between a rigid and typical property, the above mentioned R2 and T5). These scenarios are
the preferred ones selected by the logic TCL.
However, in this application setting, we could imagine to use our framework as a creativity
support tool and thus considering alternative - more surprising - scenarios by adding addi-
tional constraints. For example, we could impose that the compound concept should inherit
exactly six properties. In this case, we would get that the scenario having the highest proba-
bility (3.2%) is the one including all the properties of the HEAD, namely T1, T2, T3 and T4,
and two out of four properties of the MODIFIER, namely T6 and T8. Due to its triviality, this
scenario is discarded, in favor of the following block of two scenarios (probability 2.51%),
obtained by excluding T7 of the MODIFIER and one out of four properties of the HEAD:
T1 0.9 :: T(Villain u Chair) v DemoniacIconicity
T3 0.75 :: T(Villain u Chair) v Protagonist
T4 0.8 :: T(Villain u Chair) v Impulsive
T6 0.95 :: T(Villain u Chair) v ∃hasComponent .Back
T8 0.8 :: T(Villain u Chair) v Comfortable
T9 0.7 :: T(Villain u Chair) v Inflammable
T1 0.9 :: T(Villain u Chair) v DemoniacIconicity
T2 0.75 :: T(Villain u Chair) v ∃hasOpponent .Hero
T4 0.8 :: T(Villain u Chair) v Impulsive
T6 0.95 :: T(Villain u Chair) v ∃hasComponent .Back
T8 0.8 :: T(Villain u Chair) v Comfortable
T9 0.7 :: T(Villain u Chair) v Inflammable
These are the scenarios selected by TCL and are those providing plausible but not obvious,
creative definitions of a villain chair.
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5.3. Generating Compounds by Combining Multiple Concepts: a prototype for the
Chimera
In this section we show how the mechanism of the logic TCL can be used in order to combine
more than two atomic concepts (a case never taken into account in previous formalizations,
e.g. in [Eppe et al. (2018); Lewis and Lawry (2016)] etc.). Such examples show how the
mechanisms behind TCL can be iteratively applied without loss of efficacy in the produced
output. In our opinion, this is a symptom of the fact that our framework is able to actually
capture some foundational elements of common-sense conceptual compositionality.
Let us consider the example of a chimera, a mythological hybrid entity composed of the
parts of more than one animal. It is usually depicted as a lion, with the head of a goat po-
sitioned in the center of its body, and a tail ended with the head of a fire-breathing dragon
16.
First of all, let us describe the three atomic concepts to be combined, namely Lion , Goat ,
and Dragon . Let K be as follows:
(1) Lion v Animal
(2) 0.7 :: T(Lion) v MainColorYellowish
(3) 0.9 :: T(Lion) v ∃has.Tail
(4) 0.8 :: T(Lion) v ∃has.Mane
(5) Goat v Animal
(6) 0.7 :: T(Goat) v MainColorWhitish
(7) 0.75 :: T(Goat) v ∃has.Tail
(8) 0.9 :: T(Goat) v ∃has.Horns
(9) 0.9 :: T(Goat) v ∃has.Beards
(10) Dragon v LegendaryCreature
(11) 0.9 :: T(Dragon) v FireBreathing
(12) 0.8 :: T(Dragon) v Fly
(13) 0.9 :: T(Dragon) v Aggressive
(14) Whitish uYellowish v ⊥
We consider that Lion as the HEAD, whereas both Goat and Dragon are modifiers.
We discard all the inconsistent scenarios including both 2 and 6. We also discard the
most trivial scenario including all the typicality inclusions of the HEAD, whose probabil-
ity is 5.95% and, in the same block of scenarios, we also discard the one giving preference
to the MODIFIER Goat with respect to the HEAD. More precisely the scenario preferring
the inclusion 6 to 2. Among the remaining ones, the selected scenario having the highest
probability (2.55%) is as follows, not including both 2 and 6 (Chimera-revised knowledge
base):
• Chimera v Animal
• 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v ∃has.Tail
• 0.8 :: T(Chimera) v ∃has.Mane
• 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v ∃has.Horns
• 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v ∃has.Beards
• Chimera v LegendaryCreature
• 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v FireBreathing
• 0.8 :: T(Chimera) v Fly
16Technically this kind of combination is called conceptual blending and is slightly different from a classical combination since
the generated concept is an entirely new one and is not a subset of classes generating it, see [Nagai and Taura (2006)] for more
details on the subtle differences between the two tasks.
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• 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v Aggressive
• White uYellow v ⊥
6. Iterated Generation of Concepts: Combining Concepts from C-revised Knowledge
Bases
A C-revised knowledge base in the logic TCL is still in the language of the TCL logic. This
allows us to iteratively repeat the same procedure in order to combine not only atomic con-
cepts, but also compound concepts. In this section we show that our approach can handle also
the concept combination of C-revised knowledge bases.
Let us consider the compound concept obtained as the combination of an anti-hero – as
described by the AntiHero-knowledge base of Section 5.117 – and a chimera – Chimera-
revised knowledge base in Section 5.3.
The starting TBox T is as follows:
(1) Chimera v Animal
(2) 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v ∃has.Tail
(3) 0.8 :: T(Chimera) v ∃has.Mane
(4) 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v ∃has.Horns
(5) 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v ∃has.Beards
(6) Chimera v LegendaryCreature
(7) 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v FireBreathing
(8) 0.8 :: T(Chimera) v Fly
(9) 0.9 :: T(Chimera) v Aggressive
(10) AntiHero v ∃hasOpponent .Villain
(11) AntiHero v ∃fightsFor .PersonalGoal
(12) AntiHero vWithNegativeMoralValues
(13) 0.95 :: T(AntiHero) v Protagonist
(14) 0.75 :: T(AntiHero) v DemoniacIconicity
(15) 0.8 :: T(AntiHero) v Impulsive
We discard the most obvious scenario having a probability of 20.4% and considering all
the typicality inclusions. Also the immediately lower scenario with probability 7.18% is dis-
carded since it inherits all the properties of the HEAD (and, therefore, is trivial). As for the
case of the villain chair of Section 5, we firstly consider the following HEAD-MODIFIER
combination: chimera is the HEAD, whereas anti-hero is the MODIFIER. Given this, the sce-
narios having the highest probability (5.3%), giving preference to the HEAD, are the ones
discarding either 3 (has mane) or 8 (fly), and including all the other typicality assumptions.
These scenarios are those preferred from a cognitive point of view.
• Chimera v Animal
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Tail
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Horns
• Chimera v LegendaryCreature
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Aggressive
• AntiHero v ∃hasOpponent .Villain
• AntiHero v ∃fightsFor .PersonalGoal
17In this example we consider the first AntiHero-revised knowledge base obtained in Section 5.1.
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• AntiHero vWithNegativeMoralValues
• 0.75 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Protagonist
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v DemoniacIconicity
• 0.8 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Impulsive
• Chimera v Animal
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Beards
• Chimera v LegendaryCreature
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v FireBreathing
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Aggressive
• AntiHero v ∃hasOpponent .Villain
• AntiHero v ∃fightsFor .PersonalGoal
• AntiHero u Chimera vWithNegativeMoralValues
• 0.75 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Protagonist
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v DemoniacIconicity
• 0.8 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Impulsive
We could also consider more surprising scenarios by tuning both the number of prop-
erties inherited by the compound concepts and by reverting the assignment of the HEAD-
MODIFIER pair among the concepts. In the first case, let us restrict our concern to scenarios
allowing the chimera anti-hero to inherit 6 properties18 from the original concepts. In this
case, the scenario selected according to TCL has probability 0.11% and includes 5 out of 7
inclusions of the HEAD, namely 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and only one of the MODIFIER, namely 13. In
this case, the AntiHero − Chimera-revised knowledge base is as follows:
• Chimera v Animal
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Tail
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Horns
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Beards
• Chimera v LegendaryCreature
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v FireBreathing
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Aggressive
• AntiHero v ∃hasOpponent .Villain
• AntiHero v ∃fightsFor .PersonalGoal
• AntiHero vWithNegativeMoralValues
• 0.95 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Protagonist
Notice that, as in all the previous examples, the combined concept implicitly inherits all the
rigid properties of both HEAD and MODIFIER: here, for instance, we derive that AntiHerou
Chimera v Animal , as well as AntiHerouChimera v ∃hasOpponent .Villain , by the rigid
properties Chimera v Animal and AntiHero v ∃hasOpponent .Villain , respectively.
Let us conclude this example by swapping the HEAD and the MODIFIER, namely we ex-
ploit the logicTCL in order to define a anti-hero chimera by considering the concept AntiHero
as the HEAD and the concept Chimera as the MODIFIER. This is just based on the assump-
tion that the role played by the novel character can be more relevant from a narrative point of
view. Again, we discard the most obvious scenario having a probability of 20.4% and consid-
ering all the typicality inclusions. However, the scenario with immediately lower probability
18Of course, the number of properties can be considered as a parameter through which it is possible to play with the mechanisms
underlying the logicTCL.
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(7.18%) is selected, since it inherits only 2 out of 3 properties from the HEAD, namely those
corresponding to inclusions 13 and 14. The resulting AntiHero − Chimera-revised knowl-
edge base is as follows:
• Chimera v Animal
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Tail
• 0.8 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Mane
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Horns
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v ∃has.Beards
• Chimera v LegendaryCreature
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v FireBreathing
• 0.8 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Fly
• 0.9 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Aggressive
• AntiHero v ∃hasOpponent .Villain
• AntiHero v ∃fightsFor .PersonalGoal
• AntiHero vWithNegativeMoralValues
• 0.95 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Protagonist
• 0.8 :: T(AntiHero u Chimera) v Impulsive
7. Conclusions, Related Works and Future Research
We have introduced a nonmonotonic Description Logic TCL for concept combination, ex-
tending the DL of typicality ALC + TR with a DISPONTE semantics and with a blocking
inheritance selection heuristics coming from the cognitive semantics. This logic enjoys good
computational properties, since entailment in it remains ExpTime as the underlying mono-
tonic ALC, and is able to take into account the concept combination of prototypical prop-
erties. To this aim, the logic TCL allows to have inclusions of the form p :: T(C) v D,
representing that, with a probability p, typical Cs are also Ds. Then, several different sce-
narios – having different probabilities – are described by including or not such inclusions,
and prototypical properties of combinations of concepts are obtained by restricting reasoning
services to scenarios having suitable probabilities, excluding “trivial” ones with the highest
probabilities.
Several approaches in extending DLs with nonmonotonic capabilities have been proposed
in the literature. All these approaches are essentially based on the integration of DLs with
well established nonmonotonic reasoning mechanisms [Baader and Hollunder (1995b); Bon-
atti et al. (2015, 2009); Casini and Straccia (2010, 2013); Donini et al. (2002b); Giordano
et al. (2013a)], ranging from Reiter’s defaults to minimal knowledge and negation as failure.
In [Lukasiewicz (2008)] two probabilistic extensions of Description Logics SHIF(D) and
SHOIN (D) are introduced. These extensions are semantically based on the notion of prob-
abilistic lexicographic entailment [Lehmann (1995)] and allow to represent and reason about
prototypical properties of classes that are semantically interpreted as lexicographic entailment
introduced by Lehmann from conditional knowledge bases. Intuitively, the basic idea is to in-
terpret inclusions of the TBox and facts in the ABox as probabilistic knowledge about random
and concrete instances of concepts. As an example, in these extensions one can express that
“typically, a randomly chosen student makes use of social networks with a probability of at
least 70%” with a formula of the form (SocialNetworkUser | Student)[0.7, 1]. As the
logic of typicality ALC + TR underlying our work, the lexicographic entailment defined in
[Lukasiewicz (2008)] inherits interesting and useful nonmonotonic properties from lexico-
graphic entailment in [Lehmann (1995)], such as specificity, rational monotonicity and some
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forms of irrelevance. As a difference with our approach, here probabilities are used in order
to capture an alternative notion of typicality of concepts, rather than to express degrees of
belief of typicality inclusions that are at the base of our notion of our machinery for concept
combination. All these approaches could be seen as possible alternative with respect to the
logic of typicalityALC+TR, representing one of the building blocks of the logicTCL. How-
ever, we do not investigate here to what extent these approaches can actually be compliant
with respect to the problem of handling typicality based concept combinations. To the best of
our knowledge, there are not existing works exploiting these logics to handle the problem in
focus and we believe this aspect is worth-considering for future works.
Another related work with respect to the proposed formalism is in [Pozzato (2017b)]. Here
the author extends the logic of typicalityALC+TR by means of probabilities equipping typ-
icality inclusions of the formT(C) vp D, whose intuitive meaning is that, “normally, Cs are
Ds and we have a probability of 1− p of having exceptional Cs not being Ds”. Probabilities
of exceptions are then used in order to reason about plausible scenarios, obtained by select-
ing only some typicality assumptions and whose probabilities belong to a given and fixed
range. As a difference with the logic TCL, all typicality assumptions are systematically taken
into account: as a consequence, one cannot exploit such a DL for capturing compositionality,
since it is not possible to block inheritance of prototypical properties in concept combination.
The logic TCL extends the work of [Pozzato (2017b)] in that it does not systematically take
into account all typicality assumptions. As a consequence, TCL allows to block inheritance
of prototypical properties in concept combination. The same criticism applies also to the ap-
proach proposed in [Pozzato (2017a)], whereALC+TR is extended by inclusions of the form
T(C) vd D, where d is a degree of expectedness, used to define a preference relation among
extended ABoxes: entailment of queries is then restricted to ABoxes that are minimal with
respect to such preference relations and that represent surprising scenarios. Also in this case,
however, the resulting logic does not allow to define scenarios containing only some inclu-
sions, since all of them are systematically considered. Similarly, probabilistic DLs [Riguzzi
et al. (2015a)] themselves cannot be employed as a framework for dealing with the combina-
tion of prototypical concepts, since these logics are not equipped with reasoning mechanisms
needed for typicality based reasoning (and that, in TCL, are inherited by ALC +TR).
Several approaches have been recently introduced in order to tackle the problem of rea-
soning under probabilistic uncertainty in Description Logics. In [Lukasiewicz and Straccia
(2009)] the authors combine fuzzy Description Logics, fuzzy logic programs and probabilistic
uncertainty. An extension of the lightweight Description Logic DL− Lite within a possibility
theory setting is proposed in [Benferhat and Bouraoui (2017)]. In this approach, uncertainty
degrees are associated to inclusions in order to define the inconsistency degree of a KB. All
these approaches neglect to consider the proposed frameworks as the basis for the combina-
tion of concepts since, as already mentioned, approaches based on fuzziness fail to do the
job.
For what concerns, more specifically, the modelling of prototypical concept composition
in a human-like fashion (and with human-level performances), several approaches have been
proposed in both the AI and computational cognitive science communities. Lewis and Lawry
[Lewis and Lawry (2016)] present a detailed analysis of the limits of the set-theoretic ap-
proaches [Montague (1973)], the fuzzy logics [Dubois and Prade (1997); Zadeh (1975)]
(whose limitations was already shown in [Hampton (2011); Osherson and Smith (1981);
Smith and Osherson (1984)]), the vector-space models [Mitchell and Lapata (2010)] and
quantum probability approaches [Aerts et al. (2013)] proposed to model this phenomenon.
In addition, they propose to use hierarchical conceptual spaces [Ga¨rdenfors (2014)] to model
the phenomenon in a way that accurately reflects how humans exploit their creativity in con-
junctive concept combination. While we agree with the authors with the comments moved
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to the described approaches, in this work we have shown that our logic can equally model,
in a cognitively compliant-way, the composition of prototypes by using a computationally
effective nonmonotonic formalism. In particular, our model is able to meet all following cog-
nitive requirements [Hampton (2011); Lewis and Lawry (2016)]: i) it provides a blocking
mechanism of property inheritance for prototypical concept combination thus enabling the
possibility of dealing with a non-standard compositional behavior ii) it is able to deal with
the phenomenon of attribute emergence (and loss) for the combined concept iii) it preservers
the notions of necessity and impossibility of property attribution for the combined concept iv)
it explicitly assumes that the combination is not commutative (i.e. the different attribution of
the HEAD-MODIFER roles does non provide the same combined concept) and that v) there
are dominance effects in the concepts to be combined (both these effects are obtained via the
HEAD-MODIFIER heuristics).
With respect to other formal approaches developed to model the same phenomenon [Kamp
and Partee (1995); Smith et al. (1988)], we have also shown that our formalism is able to
account for forms of NOUN-NOUN concept combination (e.g. like stone lion or, similarly,
like porcelain cat) that such frameworks are not able to model (see [Ga¨rdenfors (1998)]).
Also: our framework does not provide any increase in the reasoning complexity with respect
to the standard monotonic DL ALC.
It is also worth-noticing that the overall reasoning procedure of TCL is directly inspired
to the Composite Prototype Model (CPM) proposed by Hampton in order to account for the
phenomenon of typicality-based composition [Hampton (1987, 1988, 2017)]. The similarity
to CPM concerns both the identification of dominant conceptual features to consider for the
composition (and this is reflected, in TCL , by considering: i) the distinction between typical
and rigid properties ii) the probability values associated to every typical inclusions iii) the
HEAD-MODIFIER difference) and the so called phenomenon of attribute emergence (shown
in the Pet Fish case). As a difference with respect to the Hampton’s model, the reasoning
procedure of TCL does not assume a process proceeding, first, on the attempt of obtaining the
compound by composing the features and then via a process of successive identification and
amalgamation of the incompatibility eventually occurring. In our case, in fact, the logic TCL
obtains the combination by directly excluding the inconsistent scenarios and resorts to all its
constituent ingredients (i.e. the non monotonic procedure of ALC + TR, the probabilistic
ranking provided by the DISPONTE semantics and the HEAD-MODIFIER heuristics) to
determine which features to inherit.
Other attempts similar to the one proposed here concerns the modelling of the concep-
tual blending phenomenon: a task where the obtained concept is entirely novel and has no
strong association with the two base concepts (for details about the differences between con-
ceptual combination and conceptual blending see [Nagai and Taura (2006)]). In this setting,
[Confalonieri et al. (2016)] proposed a mechanism for conceptual blending based on the DL
EL++. They construct the generic space of two concepts by introducing an upward refinement
operator that is used for finding common generalizations of EL++ concepts. However, differ-
ently from us, what they call prototypes are expressed in the standard monotonic DL, which
does not allow to reason about typicality and defeasible inheritance. More recently, a different
approach is proposed in [Eppe et al. (2018)], where the authors see the problem of concept
blending as a nonmonotonic search problem and proposed to use Answer Set Programming
(ASP) to deal with this search problem. As we have shown in the Chimera example, TCL is
flexible enough to be applied also to the case of conceptual blending. There is no evidence,
however, that both the frameworks of [Confalonieri et al. (2016)] and [Eppe et al. (2018)]
would be able to model (in toto or in part) conceptual combination problems like the PET
FISH. As such, TCL seems to provide a more general mechanism for modelling the combi-
natorial phenomenon of concept invention (that can be obtained both with combination and
35
blending).
We are currently developing an efficient reasoner for the logic TCL, relying on the prover
RAT-OWL [Giordano et al. (2017)] for reasoning in the nonmonotonic logic ALC + TR
underlying our approach and on the well established HermiT reasoner. The first version of the
system is implemented in Pyhton and exploits a translation of anALC+TR knowledge base
into standard ALC.
In future research we aim at extending our approach to more expressive DLs, such as those
underlying the standard OWL language. Starting from the work of [Giordano et al. (2014)],
applying the logic with the typicality operator and the rational closure to SHIQ, we intend
to study whether and how TCL could provide an alternative solution to the problem of the “all
or nothing” behavior of rational closure with respect to property inheritance.
We envision different areas of application for our framework. We have already mentioned
the field of computational creativity, but other employments can be considered. For example,
we plan to use the logic TCL as the basis for the exploitation of a new area of autonomic
computing [Huebscher and McCann (2008)] concerning the problem of the automatic gener-
ation of novel knowledge in a cognitive artificial agent, starting from an initial commonsense
knowledge base. This approach will require to enrich the knowledge processing mechanisms
of current cognitive agents [Lieto et al. (2018)] and presents an element of innovation in
that it does not assume that the only way to process and reason on new knowledge is via an
external injection of new information but via a process of automatic knowledge generation.
We believe that such an approach can find practical applications in the areas of cognitive
agent architectures and robotics. Finally, as a short-term future work, we aim at investigating
the use of TCL for generating metaphors based on frame-semantics (and therefore starting
from event-centric representations instead of subject-centric ones) by using the recently de-
veloped repository Amnestic Forgery [Gangemi et al. (2018)]. ShouldTCL prove to be able to
model also metaphorical phenomena starting from a different semantic approach, this would
represent an additional symptom that its underlying procedure captures some foundational
elements of commonsense concept combination and invention.
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